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FOREWORD 
The Internaticrnd Institute for AppIied Systems Analysis is preparing a 
Handbook of Systems Analysis, which will appear in three volumes: 
V d u m e  1: Overview is aimed at a widely varied audience of producers and 
users of systems analysis 
V d u m e  2: Methods is aimed at systems analysts who need basic knowledge of 
methods i n  which they are not expert; the volume contains introductory over- 
views of such methods 
V d u m e  3: Cases contains descriptions of actual systems analyses that illustrate 
the methods and diversity of systems analysis 
Volume 1 will have ten chapters: 
1. The  context, nature, and use of systems analysis 
2 Applied systems X I ~ ~ S ~ S :  a gvnrtic approah 
3. Examplesofsystems analysis 
t. The method of applied systems analysis: finding a solution 
5 Farmulating problems for systems analysis 
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6. Generating alternatives for systems analysis 
7. Estimating and predicting consequences 
8 Guidance for d~isiot i  
9. Implementation 
10. Principles of good pract~ce 
To these ten chapters will be added a giossary of systems analysis terms and a bibliogra- 
phy of basic books in the field. 
Drafts of this material are being widely circulated for comments and sugges- 
tions for improvement. In addition to responding to such interventions, the task of de- 
tailed coordination of the chapters-prepared separately by several autliors-has yet tcj be 
carried out. Correspondence about this material should be addressed to the undersigned. 
This Working Paper is the current draft of Chapter 4. 
A word about the format of this Working Paper. In order to make the text 
of each chapter easily amended, it has been entered into the ILASA computer, from 
which the current version can be reproduced in a few minute's time whenever needed. 
This Working Paper was produced from the version current on the date shown on each 
Page- 
Hugh J. Miser 
Survey Project 
April 28, 1980 
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T H E  M E T H O D  O F  APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS: 
FINDING A SOLUTION 
W. Findeisen, and E.S. Quade 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
Usually, for a systems analysis to be undertaken, someone must have a prob- 
lem, that is, he must be dissatisfied with the current or anticipated state of affairs and 
want help in bringing about a change for the better. Systems analysis can almost always 
provide some of this help, even if it does no more than present relevant information. 
However, the goal most frequently sought for systems analysis is to discover a course of 
action that will bring about a desired change for the better-that is, a course that can be 
judged to be most advantageous by those who have the authority to act. 
Although discovering ameliorative solutions is its first task, systems analysis 
can frequently be u d  to help bring the solutions it discovers to acceptar~ce by both the 
responsible policymakers and the people affected. In addition, after a solution is accept- 
ed, systems analysis can be applied during the process of implementation to help prevent 
the chosen coarse of action from Wing vitiated by adverse interests, misinterpretations, 
or unanticipated problems. 
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This  chapter presents the methods of systems analysis in so far  as they relate 
to discovering better solutions; advice as  to how it can be used to win acceptance or to 
ald irr implementation is postponed to later chapters. T h e  problems of winning accep- 
tance for a course of action and then implementing it must, nevertheless, be considered 
during the process of seeking and evaluating solutions, for a proposed course af action 
that is not acceptable to those who must adopt it, or that cannot be implemented for pol- 
itical or other reasons, cannot be a solution. 
Although a systems analysis may be carried out without a specific decision- 
maker in mind, this is not the usual case. Th i s  chapter discusses the methodology as if 
the analysis were being carried out for a single decisionmaker who commissioned it. 
This  decisionmaker is assumed to be an individual who wants to make his decisions by 
taking into consideration the probable consequences of each of his possible courses of ac- 
tion; as a simple extension, we can also consider the single decisionmaker to be replaced 
by a relatively small group. T h e  analyst's basic procedure is to determine what the de- 
cisionmaker wants, search out the alternatives that are available, work out the conse- 
quences that would follow the decision to adopt each of the alternatives, and then either 
rank them in  terms of their consequences according to a criterion specified by the de- 
cisionmaker or present them to the decisionmaker for ranking in snme framework suit- 
able for comparison. 
In reality, the decisionmaking situation rarely fits this paradigm; the persons 
for whom a study is done are usually no more than key participants in a decisi~nmaking 
process, who use the results of the mdysis -as eviderice a r~d  ugur~-~errt to britig others to 
their point of view. Although this more realistic decisionmaking situation may introduce 
complexities in executing some of the steps, it is our view that no major c h a n ~  in the 
basic analytic procedure is required. Thrnughnut this chapter we stick to t h e  hasic-or 
unsophisticated-view of the decisionmaking situation. For further views on the decision- 
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making paradigm see Allison 111 Rein and White 121, Lynn 191, Nelson [41 
As an example, assume that a legislative committee wants to propose legisla- 
tion to increase highway safcty. They are willing to consider measures of three types a 
requirement for devices to make the use of seat belts mandatory, lowering the rr~aximum 
speed limit and enforcing it more strictly, and establishing higher standards for issuing 
driver's licenses. They ask the le~sla t ive  analyst to carry out a systems analysis. 
In the simplest systems-analysis approach (which is essentially identical to the 
traditional decisionmaking paradigm) it is useful to consider the problem in terms of the 
following elements 
Objectives. What the decisionmaker desires to achieve. In the example, it is 
increased highway safety, a concept that the analysis must make more precise. 
Al ternat ives .  The  means by which it may be possible to achieve the objec- 
tives. In the example, there are three kinds of alternatives. 
Costs. T h e  cost of an alternative is the totality of things or actions that must 
be given up to acquire the alternative, including money, the use of personnel or facilities 
for other purposes, and so on. For example, stricter enforcement of the speed limit would 
require more police officers, who must be hired and trained or taken from other tasks; in 
either case the artion would result in a cost to be associated with any speed-control alter- 
native. 
Pafurmance Scales. A performance or effectiveness scale is a device for in- 
dicating the extent to which an objective is attained. It provides a tool for evaluating 
the performance of alternatives in achieving the objective. For example, it can be 
agreed to measure the hcrease in highway safety by the dec rem in annual traflic fatali- 
ties 
Perfmmance. The  performance or effectiveness of an alternative is the posi- 
tion on the scale it achi~ves. 
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Critsrton. A rule for decision that specifies in terms of performance and cost 
how the alternatives are to be ranked. A common one is tcj rank the alternatives in de- 
creasing order of performarice for fixed cast. 
Models. T h e  models are means by which the performance and costs, and in 
most cases the other consequences or impacts associated with adopting and implementing 
the different alternatives, are estimated or predicted. Further discussion may be found 
in Quade 151 and [61. 
Different models are required for different alternatives and for different 
purposes; a model to estimate the monetary costs of doubling the strength of the highway 
patrol differs from a model for predicting the effect the presence of this increased force 
on the highways will have on traffic fatalities A model is made up of the factors 
relevant to the problem and the essential cause-and-effect relations among them. It may 
consist of a set of tables, a series of mathematical equations or a computer program, a 
physical simulation (but rarely for systems analysis), or merely a mental image of the si- 
tuation in the mind of the analyst made explicit with a sequence of log~cal arguments 
T h e  objective and systematic approach by means of an explicit model is 
needed for predicting the impacts because, in most systems-analysis problems, the factors 
are sn numerous and their interrelations sn cnmplex that intuition is not g d  enough. 
Some safety measures, for instmce. have counterintuitive effects certain crash barriers 
reduce fatalities but increase accidents Others have interdependencies thzt st~ongly af- 
fect their joint performance: an energy-&sorbing bumper would appear t~ save more 
lives if it were installed alone than i n  combination with a shoulder harness [71. 
In our example, an early problem for the analyst is to find a way to turn the 
vague goal of "mcreased highway safety" into something of a more operat~onal character, 
or at least w!le on a way tr? meamre it. One possibility might he tn \.I= the r~duction in 
the annual number of fatalities as a measure of performance; another might be to use the 
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reduction in the annual (monetary) cost of highway accidents. Unfortunately, this 
choice may affect critically how the alternatives are ranked. For instance, while strict 
enforcement of the speed limit may reduce fatalities, a serious consequence of high-speed 
collisions, it may have little effect on the number and cost of "fender-bending" accidents, 
which are numerous, while more stringent requirements for a driver's license may reduce 
them significantly. 
Another early task for the analyst is to examine the alternatives for feasibili- 
ty. It may turn out, for example, that, in the current state of the art of automotive en- 
gineering, the alternative of automated seat belts is not feasible, say, owing to reliability 
considerations. Similarly, the analyst may be able to find out that the passage of legisla- 
tion to lower the current maximum speed limit is not politically feasible. This  alterna- 
tive may then have to be reduced merely to stricter enforcement of traffic regulations, 
dropping any thought of lowering the maximum speed limit. 
The  analyst will also want to examine alternatives not on the original list-- 
such things as better emergency ambulance service, eliminating grade crossings, changed 
car design, and others-that may promise lower fatalities at no greater cost. 
In predicting the impacts associated with the alternatives, the analyst may 
have to use radically different means or methods A model to show the effect of im- 
proved driving skills nn fatalities can be considerably different from a m d e l  to predict 
the way a lower speed limit affects fatalities. O n  the ocher hand, predictions for both 
cases may be obtained statistically from experiences ir; other jurisdicticns with simi!ar 
driving conditions. Also, to compare alternatives, various different futures may have to 
be considered, with surnpt ions  n-lade &out the effects of a petruleun-I shortage or1 auto- 
mobile traffic, changing car design. population movement, and other exogenous factors 
beyond the decisionmaker's control that can affect the outcome. 
O ~ P  run-through nf a problem is seldom ~nough; ~ v e r a l  cycles or iteratinns 
usually improve confidence in the results. For instance, it may be discovered that the 
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impacts of certain alternatives that restrict automobile drivers produce effects that 
'spill overm onto entirely different groups of people, say those that ride public transporta- 
tion, in ways that differ from alternative to alternative and were not anticipated when 
the alternatives were first formula~ed. Additional emergency medical services for 
traffic-accident victims, for instance, may increase the burden on the supply of doctors 
and hospital beds, and hence the analyst may have to enlarge the analysis to include as- 
pects of the medical system. 
With this background, we now turn to a more detailed and thorough descrip- 
tion of the procedures we have suggested. 
4.1 A F R A M E W O R K  FOR SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
Objectives, ~ l t~ rna t ives ,  choice 
Analysis to assist someone (called here the decisionmaker) to discover his 
&stm course of action may, in general, be considered as an inquiry into these three basic 
questions 
1) What are the decisionmaker's objectives? 
2) What are his alternatives for attaining these objectives? 
9) How should these alternatives be ranked? 
As  defined earlier, the objectives are what a decisionmaker seeks to arcom- 
plish or to attain as a result of his decision, and the alternatives are the means available 
to him for attaining the objectives. Depending on the particular problem, the alterna- 
tives may be policies, strategies, systems deslgns, or actions. Ranking implies designating 
the alternative that is best," conndering the consequences of implementing the various 
alternatives, the objectives, and the values the decisionmaker puts on the outcomes. 
T h e  three basic questions expand into further questions when we consider 
that: 
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- to be able to identify the feasible alternative& one must know, not only the 
objectives, but also the boundaries within which the decisionmaker is free to act, that is, 
the consrrainfs; 
- to compare and rank alternatives, one must predict the consequences (im- 
pads )  that are likely to follow from the choice of each alternahve; 
- to determine the consequences of an alternative, we need a predictive 
(cause-and-effect) model showing what will happen if the decisionmaker chooses the al- 
ternative, given a particular contingency, or alternative future slate of the world on 
which the predicted consequences will certainly depend; 
- to help the decisionmaker rank the alternatives, it may be necessary to 
determine his d u e  system and possibly that of other parties affected by some of the 
consequences. 
Because alternatives may differ radically, we may need a different model for 
each alternative. We may also use different models, from the very rough to the very 
precise, as we proceed in the analysis from the first assessments to final results. 
A framework for analysis 
Systems analysis to aid decisionmaking is a craft activity. T h e  way in which a 
study is organized and performed depends on many choices by the analyst-called secon- 
dary decisions after White [8]-that are often based or: little more :ha intuition. An ap- 
proach that may prcduce valuable insights when used by one analyst may yield faulty or 
misleadir~g conclusior~s wherr used by mother. Nevertheless, every systems ar~alysis will 
be composed of certain more or less typical activities that have to be appropriately linked 
to each other. From this point of view, we can present a first approximation to the 
systems-analysis process schematically as in Figure I, where the main cnmpnnznt: are 
represented (other breakdowns are, of course, possible): 
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1) Formulating the problem. 
2) Identifying, designing and selecting the alternatives to be considered. 
3) Forecistir~g the operational context or s t a e  of the world. 
4) Model building and predicting the consequences. 
5) Comparing and ranking outcomes 
These components encompass several additional activities, two of which are 
indicated in Figure 1: determining the constraints and determining the decisionmaker's 
values and criteria. Among those omitted from our list, but needed for almost every 
analysis, are data collection and analysis, and communicalion between analyst and de- 
cisionmaker. 
T h e  solid lines in Figure 1 show the principal flows of information from ac- 
tivity to activity. 
Iteration 
In most investigations few of the component activities depicted in Flgure 1 
can be performed adequately in a single trial Iteration is needed; that is, preliminary 
results, or even an incomplete version of the final result, may force the analyst to alter 
initial assumptinns, revise earlier work, or collect more d a t a  A decisionmaker, for in- 
stance, may not settle on his objectives until he has a good idea of what he can do, or he 
may want to impose additional constraints after he discovers what sone of the impacts 
are. 
Figure 2 shows some of the typicid iterations in a systems uilialysis study. 
One feedback loop is from the impacts (the consequences) to designing alter- 
natives. By this loop one modlfies or refines some alternatives, typically by adjusting 
thpir parameters, and eliminates o t h ~ r s .  The  proma nf refin~ment through iteration 
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may be done separately for each alternative; it is sometimes b a d  on a formal optimi- 
zation procedure. 
Another typical loop is the one from the model results back to problem for- 
mulation. This  iteration is necessary becausr! it is usually i m p i b l e  to wt the objectives 
and determhe the constraints with any sort of predsion before knowing something about 
the implications of the assumptions Iteratlon may require redefining the alternatives; 
that is, we may have to design an entirely new set of alternatives. 
Furthermore, we may be dissatisfied with the results obtained under our 
current assumptions and constraints. #Iterations may be carried out to see what the "cost" 
of the constraint is, that is, how much more of the objective could be obtained if a cm- 
stralnt were changed. W e  may eventually negotiate removing, or softening, some of the 
constraints. If this is not possible, lowering the objectives of the decisionmaker may have 
to take place. 
Another important purpose of iteration is to improve the model, a process that 
may actually simplify it, and thus lead to less detailed but more secure (robust) decisions. 
Stages of analysis 
There are many more linkages between the component activities of systems 
analysis than thnw shown in Figure 2. Despite this cnrnplex interdependence, it is cm- 
venient to discuss the procedure in three stages: 
A. Fcrmulation Stage 
B. Research Stage, com prising 
- Ger~eratirig arid investigating alternatives 
- Determinating the consequences 
- State*f -the-world forecasting 
C. Evaluation (comparison and ranking) Stage 
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Usually, the analyst is not finished, even when iteration no longer brings sig- 
nificant improvement and the various courses of action open to the decisionmaker have 
been con-ipared arid ranked. A s  mentimed in the introduction, an aidyst,  although not 
necessarily the original one, may also be called on to provide assistance with additional 
tasks-securing adoption and implementation of the results, and, later, after the work of 
implementation has succeeded (or failed), evaluating the entire process. 
Whether a course of action is feasible from the point of view of implementa- 
tion is not the main question when the analyst is helping with the actual implementation; 
infeasible alternatives should, ideally, have been eliminated during the earlier stages of 
the analysis. It is rather that the final decision may not be adequate to instruct and 
motivate those who have to execute the decision and who may have their own ideas as to 
how to interpret it. There n a y  also be considerations that are important for implemen- 
tation, but which were not important to the choice between alternatives and which, in 
order to keep the problem workable, have not been spelled out in detail. 
A decision may take so long to implement that changes in the state of the 
world different from any of those forecast in the analysis may require its modification. 
What was "the future' during the analysis becomes the present, and the analyst may be 
needed nnce again to rncdify a course of action that may now be partially nbwlete. 
In addition, the analyst may be called on to assist the decisionmaker to evalu- 
ate the progress of the irr,p!ementa:ion, far, by virtue of his previous studies of the prob- 
lem and his kncjwledge of the cause-effect relations, he may be zble to detect the rezons 
for discrepancies &.rid deviatiuns frum the effects originally ititenbed. 
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Communication 
In this context it is worth while mentioning a very important factor in systems 
analysis communicaLion. Communication with the decisionmaker is vital, although com- 
munication with others is also needed. T h e  decisionmaker's advice and judgments are 
~ndispensable at all stages of the analysis. Its results are much more likely to be accepted 
and u ~ d  if the decisionmaker participates in their production. Throughout the pro- 
c d u r e  there should be a continuous dialogue between the analyst and the 
decisionmaker-including his stafT. Th i s  dialogue influences the decisionmaker's attitude 
toward the problem even before the study is finished, and helps to make sure that the 
important facets of the real situation are considered. 
One  reason for constant communication is that the initial problem formulation 
can never be complete and all-inclusive. A s  mentioned above, partial results of analysis 
will modiq  the initial views, new questions will a r k ,  and the preferences, constraints, 
and time horizons may change. 
A constant flow of information to and from the decisionmaker and his staff 
will give them a sense of participating In the study and will mean that the results will not 
cane  to them cold, with a sense of  shock-which can lead to their rejection. 
Partial analysis 
We shall characterize the stages of systems andysis, as well as the more im- 
portant component activities, in more detail shortly. 
Before doing this, however, we note that not every systeil-rs-~-~dysis study 
contains every stage or component. Some studies may be useful even though they lack 
some of the steps in the very general schematic presentation in Figure 1; we refer to such 
studies as par t id  snalgses. H ~ r e  arp ssmp typical examples 
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- Forecasts of the future sate of the world, where no immediate action by a 
decisionmaker is contemplated; for example, econometric forecasts, which analysts are 
asked to provide for governments or large hdustrial cornpariies. 
- Impact analysis, i.e., determining all impacts, or even merely certain im- 
pacts, of a proposed course of action. For example, studies to determine the consequences 
of a particular technological development on the environment may involve no comparison 
or ranking. 
- Decision analysis, that is, assistance in making a choice among a limited 
number of well specified alternatives, whose consequences are assumed to be known. 
Here the analysis merely provides a framework for ranking these alternatives. A typical 
instance is the choice of an industrial project from among several available alternatives, 
or a decision to buy equipment from competitive suppliers. 
In these examples, not all of the component activities of a complete systems 
analysis are carried out by the analysts. O n  the other hand, there are cases, where all 
the activities are present, but where some of them need to be emphasized more than oth- 
ers. 
Whenever a partial analysis is commissioned, the asumption is that the de- 
cisionmaker hims~lf  is providing the missing aspects through judgment or assumption. 
Thus, the need for good communication is particularly important here. 
4.2 FROBLEM F O R M U L A T I O N  
Goals and difficulties 
Generally speaking, problem formulation implies isolating the questions or is- 
sues involved, fixing the context within which these issues are to be resolved, clarifying 
the objectives, identifying the people to be affected by the decision, discovering the ma- 
jor operative factors, and deciding on the initial approach to be taken in the analysis. It 
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is expected that problem formulation will provide, among other things: 
(a) a preliminary statement of the objectives. and ways to measure their 
achievement, 
(b) a syec i f ica t i~~ of some promising courses of action, i.e., the alternatives, 
(c) a definition of the constraints, 
(d) an anticipation of the consequences, the measures of their value, and a de- 
finition of the criteria for choice. 
Problem formulation should result in specifying its limits, what question is to 
be addressed, and what aspects of the real world are to be included, in what time frame, 
with what analytic resources. 
During this formulation, the analyst must consider the analytic approach to be 
taken, which, of course, depends on the information and the type of problem. For exam- 
ple, the decisionmaker may have been assigned a fixed budget and desire to find the 
most effective available alternative, or, he may have a desired level of effectiveness he 
wants to achieve, in which case the objective of the analysis becomes identifying the 
least-cost mix of alternatives Another possibliity is that progress is required in the 
correcting some undesirable condition, and the analytic objective is to discover the point 
at which the marginal benefits o f  corrective action become equal to the marginal costs, or 
to ascertain whether mme proposed course of action yields a sufficiently high rate of re- 
turn on the required investment to make it attractive. 
As  the study progresses and more information becomes avivailable, the analytic 
approach may have t~ be modified. 
In a en=, forniulation is the most irnportult stage of arialysis, fur the effort 
spent restating the problem in different ways, or redefining it. clarifies whether or not it 
is spurious or trivial, and may, indeed, point the way toward a solution. 
Among the difficulties of problem formulation these us~ually stand nut: 
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(i) No issue is isolated; every system is linked to other systems and it is thus 
part of a larger one. There is therefore a mutual dependence of the objectives, con- 
straints, and culssequencrs 
(ii) W e  cannot set the objectives firmly unless we know what can be achieved, 
that is, until we know-w~th reasonable accuracy-the results of analysis 
(iii) T h e  objectives, as well as the measures of value and the criteria for 
choice, are highly subjective and depend on the decisionmaker's preferences, which may 
be both difficult to assess and varying over time. This  applies, in particular, to high- 
level objectives, which are seldom stated in any sort of operational form. 
For many reasons, the problem-formulation stage can be seen as almost a 
crude systems-analysis study in itself. It may involve a very broad range of inquiries 
into the hierarchies of objectives, the value systems, the various types of constraints, the 
alternatives available, the presumed consequences, how the people affected will react to 
the consequences, etc. A systematic approach to problem formulation through some fairly 
formal device such as an %sue paper" may be desirable; Chapter 5 describes this device 
and provides other information about problem formulation. One reason is that, until the 
problem has been defined and the issues clarified, it may not be clear that the s tudy  ef- 
fort will be wnrth while. 
Objectives 
T h e  objectives we what a decisionmziker seeks io accomplish cjr tcj  attain by 
meals of his dciisiun, that is, by the course uf actiorr he decides to iri~plernent. 
T h e  analyst has to determine what the decisionmaker's objectives actually 
are; Chapters 5 and 8 g v e  a more thorough discussion of the d~iiiculties tha: are ire- 
quently encoanterrld at this stage. For the present purpsp, we state merely that an nb- 
jective may be specified in a more or less general fashion, may be quantified or not 
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quantified, and Is usually a step in a hierarchy of objectives; one speaks about different 
Irvels o f  the objectives. 
Often the levels of objectives differ according to the time horizon. For ex- 
ample, h economic planning, or In corporate planning, there is a hierarchy of short-term 
and long-term objectives that have to be consistent with one another. 
The fear of setting up objectives that may prove to be inconsistent with 
higher-level, more comprehensive objectives, may lead a decisionmaker to specify an ob- 
jective at too high a level to be helpful in the analysis. For one reason, the courses of ac- 
tion that are required to attain this higher level objective may not be his to choose. 
It is the objectives that suggest the alternatives, for, to be considered an al- 
ternative, a course of action must offer, or appear to offer, some chance of attaining the 
objectives. As more inform ation becomes available, the list of alternatives may increase 
or decrease. 
Unless the objectives are correctly and clearly spelled out, the rest of the 
analysis will be misdirected-wrong and ineffectual alternatives will be proposed that do 
not favorably affect the problem that generated the analysis T o  define objectives it is 
often helpful to call on several people not involved with the problem under analysis, par- 
ticularly outsiders skeptical of what they think the decisionmaker is trying to do. Anoth- 
er possibility is to start by pecif).ing a measure of performance that E m s  appealing and 
then examining the objectives it serves. In effect, one keeps trying to answer such ques- 
tions as: What is the decisionmaker really trying to accomplish? What ultimate good 
result is desired? For example, what objective is really served by lowering the speed 
lim it? 
We would like to be able, for the sake of analysis. to measure the degree to 
which an objective will be attained by a course of action under consideration. For this 
reason, if the original objective cannot be quantified, one must &en define a proxy oljec- 
tiue: a substitute that points in the same direction as the original objective, but which can 
April 28. 1980 
Draft:28-Apr- 1980 - 18- Chapter Four 
be measured. For example, 'reduction of mean travel time' in urban transportation 
can be a proxy for "Iproved services.' 
If the degree to which the objective has been attained is measurable in some 
sense, one can set a CargeC d u e ;  for exarr~yle, 'achieve ar1 average travel time of 40 
minutes'. Often, co be more flexible, we prescribe an interval, for example, 'achieve an 
average travel time of less than 45 minutesm, wh~ch leaves more freedom for the choice 
of alternatives. 
Another ambiguity that must be clarified is how the consequences of the 
course of action designed to attain a particular objective are related to it; for example, 
how do the various attributes of a transportation system as part of a program to improve 
the quality of urban life-time of travel, comfort, convenience, noise, air pollution, cost, 
some desirable, some undesirable-actually relate to this objective? 
In many cases, the decisionm aker specifies multiple obectives. These objec- 
tives frequently contribute to a single higher-level objective, although we may not be 
able to measure how much. 
An example of such a situation is 'the quality of urban life," as a higher-level 
objective to which several component objectives, such as better housing, less air pollution, 
reduced travel times, less aesthetic discomfort, and others, contribute. If  we cannot work 
out the relative contribution of each factor, we ordinarily seek alternatives that improve, 
in a measurable degree, all, or the majority, of the contributing component objectives, 
leaving the ultimate ranking to the decisionmakers. 
Multiple objectives are usually competitive, i.e, an alternative designed to 
bring atuut maximun-I iri~yrovernerit hi otie uf them is iissrjciateil with a detetiur.ation in 
some of others, because of limited resources or other constraints. 
A reconciliatian of the multiple objectives may present a serious problem, 
treated in Chapter 8 and in numernur; publications (fnr example, K e ~ n ~ y  and Raiffa [9] 
and Bell, Keeney, and Raiffa ElOD. 
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Values and criteria 
A course of action will have many consequences, some contributing to the o t -  
jective, some detracting, with still others being side effects, that is, consequences that are 
neutral with respect to the objective, but possibly with productive or counterproductive 
implications If we wish to say how good an alternative is we need a measure of value 
for each of its significant consequence. If we want, moreover, to be able to compare dif- 
ferent alternatives in order to indicate a preference, we need criteria for ranking them in 
order of preference. 
A measure of value is subjective. T h e  same thing may be of different value 
to different people. In principle, it is the value or 'desirability" for the decisionmaker 
that is important, because he will decide whether or not to take a given course of action. 
But, in all cases, the persons or groups the decisionmaker is serving, or who will be af- 
fected by his decision, must be considered 
For example, consider the air pollution to be caused by a future industrial 
plant. Assuming that no pollution standards or penalties exist, does this mean that the 
industrial manager can neglect pollution, although he knows the damage i t  will cause? 
Clearly, he cannot neglect pollution without a deliberate decision to do so, because the 
people affected may in one way or another, say through their influence on future stan- 
dards, affect the profits of the plant. It is the duty of the analyst, in this case at least, to 
indicate the impact of pollution on those who will be affected, and smehow to transfer 
their subquen t  dimtisfsactiorr to the decisiot~maker's b d u ~ c e  sheet. 
T h e  values held by the decisionmaker, that is to say, the importance he  attri- 
butes to the various impacts, determine the criteria for ranking the alternat~ves; hence 
the decisionmaker's values must be investigated at an early stage. We define a criterion 
as a "rule or standard by which to rank the alternatives in order of desirability." An 
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example might be: 'given a fixed task, rank the alternative first that can accomplish it 
at the least cost.' 
T h e  values and criteria of interest are those of the decisionmaker. T h e  aim 
of systems ar~alysis, especially on public issues, is not to say what the decision ought to be, 
the analyst can only say tha.t, given the criterion and his best knowledge about the 
decisionmaker's values, the alternatives should be ranked in a particular order. A s  m n  
as the analyst makes recommendations, based on his own values, as to what the decision 
should be, the analyst is abandoning his role as an analyst and becoming an advocate. 
This  may be an appropriate role in some cases, but when assumed the analyst should 
make clear what he is doing. 
More attention to the problem of criteria is given in section 4.6 on "Compar- 
ing and ranking alternatives' and in Chapter 8. 
Constraints 
Cunstraints  are restrictions on the alternatives; they may be physical proper- 
ties of systems, natural limitations, or imposed boundaries that do not permit certain ac- 
tions to be taken. Thus, the constraints may imply that certain consequences cannot be 
obtained and that certain objectives cannot be achieved. T h e  alternatives, consequences, 
and objectives that are not prohibited, directly or indirectly, by the constraints are re- 
ferred to as feasible. 
Some examples of possible constraints are: physical laws, natural-resource 
limitations, available manpower, existing legslation, accepted ethics, allocated investment 
munry. 
There are two main questions related to constraints in the analysis: 
(i) What are  the constraints? 
(ii) What is thpir Infltc.ace, i . ~ . ,  what actions, and h ~ n c ~  what cnn,oquences 
and objectives, are feasible? 
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Some answers to the fvst questim will be discovered during problem formu- 
lation, but not all constraints may be revealed in the initial formulatim; some may be 
discovered at later stages and others not until after implementation has started. 
Finding answers to the x o n d  questitm is an essential part of the analyst's 
task. In fact, the question of feasbility is an important, if not dominant, component in  
systems analysis, and usually a difficult one to deal with. An investigation of the feasi- 
bility of actions or objectives is referred to as feasibility analysis. 
There are many different kinds of constraints. Some are permanent and can 
never be violated (physical laws, global resources). Others are binding in the slimt run, 
but may be changed by the passage of time or by decision (e.g, legidation). Still others 
are arbitrary, set by the political situation or merely by the decisionmaker's tastes. 
There are different mnstraints at different levels of decisionmaking. Usually 
the smaller the scale of a problem is, the more constraints are imposed on it in an arbi- 
trary rather than in a natural and objective way. For example, an analysis of alternative 
urban transportation systems would have to consider a cost constraint, air and noise pol- 
lution standards, and perhaps also an employment cmstraint. All these are constraints 
imposed by decisions made at a higher level, usually of the resource-allocation type, and 
not directly by the available resources. 
Depending on their character (objectively existing, or imposed by a decision) 
the various constraints are treated in essentially two different ways Swne constraints are 
rigid or unquestionable; to this category certainly belong the constraints of natural laws 
and natural remurcrs We have already indicated, however, that the latter are rigid 
only at a relatively high level. For a aty, or an industrial plant, the resource constraints 
are often the result of an aliocahon decision and may therefore be considered elastic or 
negotiable. By elastic or negotiable constraints we mean ones that may, i n  principle, be 
changed by a higher-level decision if the analysis provides a good case for the change. 
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Providing the case may consist, for example, in showing how much more of the objec- 
tive can be gained if the given constraint is changed by one unit. A calculation of this 
kind is called marginal andjsis. It  may happen, for example, that a slight lowering of 
the standard of adrrlissible pollution would cause a substantial reduction in the cost of 
producing an industrial product. 
Margnal  analysis determines a price of the constraint; we should not fbrget, 
however, that it is, for example, the price or worth of the constraint to the polluting par- 
ty, not to those who are being polluted. 
What has been said so far  about the constraints by no means applies only to 
constraints of a quantitative nature. Political and cultural constraints may have to be 
considered in certain analyses Constraints of any kind may be divided into the 
categories of short-run and long-run constraints and into rigid and removable (or negoti- 
able) constraints There will also be different constraints at different levels of decision. 
As already said, it cannot be expected that all constraints, and much less so 
the feasible sets that result from the constraints, will be revealed at the initial stage of 
problem formulation. Nevertheless, it is important to define at least the most influential 
constraints at this stage. With respect to those resulting from higher-level decisions, it is 
desirable to get some feel as to how firm these constraints are and, in particular, whether 
they are defined and definite for the whole time horizon. Otherwise, the analysis may 
investigate actions or alternatives that will be entirely inappropriate. 
Constraints imposed by the client or decisionmaker are in the same category 
as goals, for it is doubtful if any real distinction can be made [ I l l .  Goals, in fact, are lit- 
tle more than constraints selected for specid attention because they n-lotivate the de- 
cisionmaker or because it is convenient for the analysis. 
A discussion oi some of the difficulties in problem t'ormulation may be found 
in M ajnne and (SLUadp [ 121. 
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4.3 GENERATING AND SELECTING ALTERNATIVES 
Characteristics 
It can hardly be overstressed that generating alternatives is, in systems 
analysis, an exerase of creativity and imagination appropriately tempered by a thorough 
and broad knowledge of the issues. The  alternatives that have to be considered in a 
particular case may be wide-ranging and need not be obvious substitutes for each other 
or perform the same specific functions Thus, for example, education, recreation, family 
subsidy, police surveillance, and low-income housing (either alone or combined in various 
ways) may all have to be considered as passible alternatives for combating juvenile del- 
inquency. In additim, the alternatives are n a  merely the options known to the decisim- 
maker and the analysts at the start; they include whatever additional options can be 
discovered or invented later. 
The W of potential alternatives initially includes all courses of action that 
offer some chance of attaining or partially attaining the objectives Later, as the cm- 
straints are discovered and applied, the set is reduced. The  set of alternatives con- 
sidered usually includes the 'null' alternative, the case of no action, if only for the pur- 
pose of comparison. 
In most c a s ,  a number of alternatives are explicitly suggested by the de- 
cisionmaker, i.e, they are defined by a more or less detailed enumeration of their specific 
characteristics. For example, to improve urban transportation, both a subway to cover 
certain regions with stations and surface connections to outlying districts and a bus line 
with routes and schedules can be specified as alternatives to be considered. 
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Desired properties 
T h e  alternatives that survive to the final ranking will have to be feasible. 
They will also have to 8x1 a long way toward metirig' the decisionmaker's objectives. 
But, apart from feasibility and meeting stated objectives, such as a desired carrying 
capacity for an urban transportation system and a wish to keep the mean travel time as 
low as possible, there are other vital features that, while they may not be explicitly stated 
as objectives, should be considered in creating and evaluating the alternatives. 
One of these, an almost indispensable feature of an acceptable alternative, is 
its insensitivity (robustness), measured by the degree to which attainment of the objec- 
tives will be sustained despite disturbances encountered in normal operation, such as 
varying loads, changing weather conditions, etc. In urban transportation, insensitivity 
could mean, for example, that the average travel time does not greatly increase even 
when the peak-hour load and street traffic are increased by 25R, 5W., or more. 
Another feature important for many applications is reliability, which is the 
probability that the system is operational at any given time, as opposed to being out of 
order. In some cases, it is important for the proposed system never to fail; in others, that 
it not fail for a time longer than some threshold value; and in still other cases, a failure is 
tolerable if it can be repaired quickly; this feature, in turn, brings us to the question of 
maintenance and, consequently, logistics. 
One  says that a system is mlnerable if damage or failure of ar, element 
causes considerable trouble in meeting the objectives (vulnerability does not mean, or 
does not necessarily n-lean, cuniplete Pililre). Irl the urban transportation example, a bus 
system is vulnerable to snow storms. 
Flexibility IS a property exhibited by an alternative designed to do a certain 
job when it can h e  used for a modified, or even an pntirely different, purposl. It is im- 
portant to have a flexible alternative when the objectives may change or when the un- 
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certainties are very great. For example, for transferring fuel, rail transportation is 
more flexible than pipelines 
In addition, each alternative that survives the other hurdles must be exarn- 
ined with the problems of implementation in mind. Some alternatives will be easier to 
implement than others, those impossible to implement must be eliminated and the cost of 
implementation associated with each of the others must be taken into account. 
Generating alternatives is above all a crafl or art, an exercise of imagination, 
creativity, criticism, and experience. It is the diversity of alternatives. so often encoun- 
tered in systems analysis, that calls for creativity and ingenuity rather than for a deep 
knowledge of formal tools. Therefore, what we say below can only be a loose guideline, a 
framework, which may be of assistance in some cases and useless in others. 
Whenever a diversity of means exists to achieve the objectives, generating 
and selecting alternatives are best done in steps or stages Initially, it is appropriate to 
consider a fairly large number of possiblities as alternatives; any scheme that has a 
chance of being feasible (that is, not likely to violate the constraints), and of meeting the 
oqjectives should be investigated. A t  the beginning, it is good to encourage invention and 
unconventionality; foolish ideas may not be foolish when looked at more closely. It  may 
often be advisable to reach beyond the less rigid constraints, to broaden the scope of the 
study outside the limits that were initially set forth by the client. 
T h e  many alternatives that can be considered initially cannot all be investi- 
gated in detail. It would be too costly and, above all, excessively time--consuming. Some 
kind of screening, based on expert judgment, evidence from past cases, or simple mdels ,  
ca i  often be used to select a few of the alterndives as mure promising for the lsext stages 
of investigation. It may. for example. be possible to reject some alternatives by domi- 
nance: i.e., because another alternative exists that is better in at least one aspect and 
equally good in all the remaining aspects considered. 
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T h e  stages that follow the initial scrutiny should involve an increasing 
amount of quantitative assessment A t  first, the assessment of the consequences of each 
alterr~ative may still miss marly details, but it should be adequate tu permit rejecting a 
fair percentage of the orlginal alternatives on the ground that the other cases are more 
promising. 
T h e  last stage of the selection procedure should investigate relatively few al- 
ternatives, but in considerable d e t d .  These alternatives should be serious candidates for 
implementation. At this stage every effort should be made to assess each alternative as 
accurately as possible, and each one may have to be fine-tuned, to yield the best results 
possible. 
As  can be seen, we favor a precedure of step-by-step rejection of alternatives 
rather than one of focusing on selecting the best alternative in a single operation. This  
procedure has some rationale, first, the alternatives that are shown to be infeasible can be 
rejected (irrespective of what they promise in terms of benefits); next, the alternatives 
that can be shown to be markedly sensitive or vulnerable can be rejected, etc. It is, in 
many cases of judgment, easier to agree on rejection than to agree on positive selection. 
Fine tuning a l t ~ r n a t i v ~ s  
W e  use the term fine tuning to refer to determining the details of an alterna- 
tive. Less detail may be needed fm making a choice among the widfly different types of 
alternatives, more d e t d  ma): be necessary before selecting one of a selected type for im- 
plen-~entatiorr. A t  the iri~pleri~entatim stage, systrrr~s aialysis cjveriaps with 'systen-IS 
design" or 'systems engineering,' where-for example. for an industrial plant-the job is 
to determine all specifications for the consecutive design of the particular parts of the 
plant. 
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Fine tuning is an activity that may. in appropriate cases, make good use of 
mathematical models. The  problems are usually well defined when fine tuning is ap- 
propriate and setting the details may be ideal for formal procedures for optimization, 
such as linear programming. 
4.4 DETERMINlNG THE CONSEQUENCES 
Future and uncertainty 
An important analytic task is to predict the c o n s d p e n u s  ( a l a  referred tcj as 
impacts. effects, or outcomes) of each alternative that is being considered. The  task is 
difficult because of uncertainty, particularly with respect to the future state of nature or 
the cmtext in which the alternatives are to operate. 
With the future in mind, assessing a course of action involves answering two 
questions: 
(i) What will happen as a result of this action? 
(ii) What will happen without this action! 
Neither of these questions can ever be answered with certainty, because both 
involve one or more forecasts of future conditions, i.e., of the future states of the world or 
at least the segment of the world being considered in the study. T h e e  forecasts will 
often have the form of multiple scenarios. 
It is essential to ask a question related to the probabilistic properties of these 
forecasts 
(iii) How certain are the answers to (i) and (ii) that the analysis can supply? 
The last question may be split into various subquestions important for a pven 
case, eg., what is the range of likely outcomes of the action? Is there a passibility, even a 
very unlikely one, that the action's consequences will turn out to be very undesirable? 
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Listing the consequences 
A particular alternative will have a large number of consequences. Some of 
these are benefits, things that one would like to have and which cor~tribute positively to 
attaining the objectives; others are costs, negative values, things that one would like to 
avoid or minimize. Some of the consequences associated with an alternative may have so 
little apparent effect, positive or negative, on attaining the desired objective, that they 
are not considered in the analysis; they are referred to as externczlities. Some of these, 
however, may affect or spill over on the interests of other groups of people or other de- 
cisionmakers, who in turn may affect the decision by making their objections known to 
the analysts or through pressure on the decisionmakers. It may therefore become neces- 
sary, in the course of analysis, to broaden the study to introduce the spillovers (which 
were previously externahties) into the revised analysis. 
Broadening of the study can also change the judgment of what is a cost and 
what is a benefit. A new investment is a cost to the industrial company; but it may be a 
benefit from a regional or national point of view, if it helps reduce unemployment. 
In the narrow sense, costs are the resources required to implement an alterna- 
tive. Tn the broader sense, costs are the "opportunities foregonen-all the things we cannot 
have or do once we have chosen a particular alternative. Many, but by no means all, 
casts c m  be expressed adequately in money or other quantitative terms. Others cannot. 
For example, if the goa! of a decision is to lower automobile traffic fatalities, the delay 
caused to motorists by schemes that force a lower speed in a relatively uncrowded and 
safe sectiorr of ruad will be corrsidered a cost by most drivers. Such delay not only has a 
negative value in itself, which may be expressed partially in monetary terms, but it may 
cause irritation and speeding elsewhere and thus lead to an increased accident rate or 
even tn a cnntprnpt fnr law, a chain of negative consequPncPs that can be difficult to 
quantify. 
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An important question, and one of the analyst's important decisions, is the 
width of the spectrum of consequences to consider. Naming, or listing, the relevant 
consequences is needed. But which are the relevant ones? W e  cannot avoid some assess- 
ment of the magnitudes and values of the consequences at an early stage. For practical 
reasons, analysis must be limited: if we consider too many phenomena in the physical, 
economic, and social environment as being related to the issue under investigation (too 
many impacts), then the analysis will become expensive, time-consuming, and ineffective. 
The  important consequences are those the decisionmaker will take into account in making 
his decision, but his list may have to be amplified, for he is alsa an interested party and 
may stress beneficial outcomes while neglecting those implying costs or irrelevant to him 
but detrimental to others. 
Therefore, the major responsibility is with the analyst: what consequences to 
consider is one of the important "secondary decisions" in the study. There is little, if any, 
theory on which to base this decision. Initial assessments based on experience, common 
sense, and understanding of the issue are a starting point, but may have to be revised in 
. 
the course of analysis. 
There is one more question related to listing the consequences. How far 
ahead into the future shall the consequences be considered? 
At least two factors influence the answer: 
- first, how far-reaching are the objectives (what is the decisionmaker's time 
horizon), and 
- second, how lung will the consequences (beneficial a - ~ d  etriri~eritai) last? 
These two factors are quite different, and they may be confiicting in the sense 
that an action taken to ach~eve a short-term objectme may have long-lasting conse- 
quences that make it harder to achieve an objective more remote in timp T h p  time hor- 
izon of analysis has to be matched to both; the analyst is obliged to tel! a short-sighted 
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decisionmaker what the consequences of his action will be in the more distant future. 
Predictive models 
Analysis predicts what the consequences will be. They cannot be measured or 
observed; they must be predicted from the present understanding of the future situation 
and of what the real relations are between the action and its consequences. The process, 
device, or scheme used for prediction is called a model. 
The models used in systems analysis may be formal (e-g., mathematical ex- 
pressions, diagrams, tables), or judgmental (eg., as formed by the deductions and asszss- 
ments contained in the mind of an expert). The models most used, on the whole the 
most useful, and often the only type even considered, are mathematical models. A 
mathematical model consists of a set of equations and other formal relations that attempt 
to describe the processes determining the outcome of alternative actions. These models, 
as do any models, depend for their validity on the quality of the scientific information 
they represent. A mathematical model is often presented and used in the form of a com- 
puter program. Our  current capability to design valid and reliable models of these types 
* 
is limited, particularly for questions of public policy, where social and political mnsidera- 
tions tend to duninate. Here, what may be regarded as less satisfactory judgmental 
mcdels, that depend more, and more directly, on expertise and intuition and are not as 
precise and manageable, may have to be used to predict the consequences of an alterna- 
tive. If they are to generate confidence in others, however, they should be made as ex- 
plicit as possible. 
An explicit model of my kind introduces structure and tern-linui%y to  a 
problem and provides a means for breaking a complicated decision into srnalier tasks 
that can be handled one at a time. It also serves as an effective means of communica- 
tion, enabling the participants in n study to make their judgments within a defined cm- 
text and in proper relation to the judgments of others. Moreover, through feedback-the 
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results of computation in a mathematical model or the criticism of an expert's judg- 
ment, for instance-the model can help the analysts and the experts m whom they 
depend to revise their earlier judgments and thus arrive at a clearer understanding of 
their subject matter and of the prutlem. 
These secondary characteristics of a model-separating tasks and providing a 
systematic, efficient, and explicit way to focus judgment and intuition-are crucially im- 
portant, for they provide a way of tracing out the major consequences when adequate 
quantitative methods are not available. 
It is convenient, in the models, to distinguish two sets of factors that influence 
simultaneously the outcomes; the consequences y depend on the action a and the state of 
nature a. "State of nature" is a name given to all exogenous factors, that is, ones beyond 
control by action a, but which nevertheless influence the consequences y. T h e  important 
convenience of this approach is that the forecast of the future conditions, and therefore 
most of the uncertainty, is now contained in the independent, partially random value of e. 
We can write 
9 = f (aye)* 
(1) 
where we mean that "y depends on both a and a," or, stressing the causality, 3 is caused 
by both a and e." 
The relation (1) may be considered the general form of a predictiue mode!. 
It is 'predictive' in the sense that, given a and e, it determines y .  W e  refer to it as a 
"model' to stress that, whatever the efforts, our knowledge about the dependencies is res- 
tricted arid the r e d  relhtion is different. 
We do not imply. by any means, that (1) has some particular form, e.g.. that it 
is a formal mathematical nodel. It may be a "mental model," contained in the expert's 
mind, never written down in any form; hut neverth~less it may supply statements of the 
sort: "if action a is taken, given condition e, g will resu!tl' 
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Object system and environment 
1r1 ar~alyzing consequences, one always has to make a practical distinction 
between the object system (which we influence) and its environment, the state of nature 
or context, as we also call it. 
From the point of view of the purpose, which is to predict the consequences of 
a course of action, we may call the environment 'the aspects of the world outside the ob- 
ject system that influence the consequences, but are not influenced themselves by the 
course of action considered." 
We take a pragmatic approach in this definition. Rather than stating that 
everything is related to everything else, we draw a boundary between what has an influ- 
ence on the consequences that we consider, and what has none (not all the outside world 
is considered to be the environment), and we draw another boundary between what we 
influence by an action (the consequences), and what we do not influence. 
In other words: although, in principle, the action we take does influence 
everything else, we choose to divide the relevant world into two parts, the object system 
that we assume to influence, and the environment, which is an uninfluenced source of ex- 
ogenous actions. 
T h e  actual decision, that is, setting the boundaries, is subject to decision by 
the analyst, a decision tha: may, on the one hand enlighten the analysis and make it a 
feasible task, but on the other yield superficial, oversimplified, and misleading results. A 
g r e ~ t  deal of clear thirrking is necessary to take proper acruurrt of the interactiurrs in- 
volved. to decide what will be taken into consideration and what can be negiected. 
Depending on the case, the environment may include, for example, demographic factors, 
social attitudes, the pnlitical and ecnnomic situation, and so on. 
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Model-building limitations; need for experiments 
Even in the situations where the phenomena to be predicted are quantifiable, 
the correctness (validity) of n~odels is limited by several factors: restricted knowledge of 
the laws of system behavior, inadequate data, inability to deal effectively with very com- 
plex relationships, and so on. 
The art of model-building has its limitations. Some of these are: 
- the data from passive observations alone may not reveal the cause-effect 
relationships, 
- the causal laws that we know, even for physical systems such as chemical 
reactors, are not enough alone to provide exact models because of the complexity of real 
systems. 
In most cases of model building, both of these sol;rces of information have to 
be used. They may still be inadequate; then the model-builders may suggest experi- 
ments. An experiment mlght consist, for example, of testing a proposed course of action 
on a sample, and on a parallel control group, observing the results, and then using them 
both for building a model for arriving at conclusions about the action, and for modifying 
it before it is applied full-scale. 
An experiment can tell how the system reacts in the present, but not how it 
will react in the future, under changed conditions that cannot be duplicated in the exper- 
iment. Because of this principal hitat ion of experiments, we should not overlook the 
fact that experimentation alone can hardly be a substitute for other study of a problem, 
but shuuld rather be currsidered a complementary activity. 
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Simulating intervening decisionmakers 
T h e  systems that we described so simply by equation (1) may be, internally, 
very con-~plex. A p . ~ t i c u l ~  difficulty arises when the system contains one or more de- 
cisionmakers whose decisions depend on the action a. These decisionmakers who incer- 
vene in the process are part of the system; they cannot be considered the environment, 
because they are influenced by a. They can be individuals, social groups, and so on. We 
have to incorporate them, that is, their behavior, into the model. 
For example, we may wish to predict what decrease in gasoline consumption 
will be caused by a rise in its price; this prediction involves an assumption about the de- 
cisions of individual consumers who will decide how much to buy. In the analysis, we 
can lump all consumers into a single unit (the market), or consider different groups of 
cmsumers: farmers, com muters, low, middle, and high income divisions, etc. 
It may be reasonable to assume that these other decisionmakers behave ra- 
tionally; for example, that they maximize their net benefits. Then it would be relatively 
easy to describe them by some fixed mathematical models. Popular versions of such 
models are the demand functions, which express how much of a commodity the consu- 
mer will buy at various prices. These functions are derived by optimizing an assumed 
objpctive, the implied objective of the consumer. 
In many cases, the assumptions about human decisionmaking cannot be re- 
duced to an optinizatior: problem. We may not know what form of :he objective the de- 
cisionmakers would optimize. This  is a reason for the growing imprtance-for systems 
anaiysis-of the psyihulugiid and ~ i o l u g i c d  theory of value UICI choice. We arc unable 
to predict the consequences of a course of action unless we understand the laws of 
behavior of the group that wll be at'fected by this action [ IYj. 
If we know r?f t h ~  ~ x i s t ~ n c e ,  position, and action pnssihiliti~s of o t h ~ r  d~c i s im-  
makers, we may try to imitate their behavior by appropriately chosen actors. We expect 
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these actors to behave, in the model, in a way that corresponds to what the actual de- 
cisionmakers would do in real-world situations, with all the ambiguity and uncertainty. 
We simulate the decisionmakers. 
If all of the dependencies, except for human decisionmaking, are pro- 
grammed into a computer, the whole model becomes m interactive model, or man- 
machine model, where human decisions interact with input and output data fiom the 
computer program. 
Models of this kind, although not necessarily involving computers, have been 
known for a long time under the names of operational games, war games, business games, 
etc., depending on the context. 
Using models 
Using a predictive model is in principle very simple: we take the proposed 
action as an input to it, the assumed or predicted future state of nature as another input, 
and record the output, that is, the model-predicted consequences. 
It is also important to use the model for sensitivity analjsis: how m the 
consequences changed if one modifies the action (sensitivity to action) and how are the 
consequences changed if the exogenous factors change (sensitivity to environmental con- 
ditions). A similar investigation, but with respect to major changes in the a~sumptions 
about the future state of the world, is sometimes referred to as contingency analysis. 
In many applicat~ons, low sensitivities are important, for the simple reasor, 
that no action will ever be implemented with absolute adequacy, no exogenous factor will 
keep to the forecasted vduc, atid the model from which the results are obtained is never 
absolutely accurate. 
T h e  actual techniques by which the consequences, for given inputs, are 
predicted depends rm the kind of model, for example, whether it is an analytic m d e l  (an 
explicit mathematical relation or formula) or a judgmental (mental) model. However, all 
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kinds of useful models should permit assessing sensitivities. 
We are well aware that the future can be determined only in a probabilistic 
way. I t  is therefore correct, at least in principle, to ask the model to predict the proba- 
bilistic features of the consequences. We may, for example, be interested ir~ the range or 
interval within which a consequence will be contained with some given (and high) proba- 
b~lity. Obtavling answers of' this kind requires much information, which will seldom be 
found in systems-analysis applications In particular, adequate probabilistic data on the 
future state of nature, i-e., on future environmental inputs, would have to be available, 
but seldom are. 
W e  should also mention that the techniques of estimating the probabilistic 
features of the outcomes may be quite complex and time-consuming. Unless an analytic 
model is available, a stochastic cornpurer simulation can be carried out. In this tech- 
nique, the computer model is subjected to a large number of suitably generated random 
inputs, which imitate the stochastic environment. A statistical analysis of the outputs 
provides the required probabilistic d a t a  This  kind of analysis is important in some ap- 
plications In many cases, however, a computer simulation is the least desirable model. It 
is costly, except in the model-building stage, and it has low insight, since it does not show 
how the observed outcomes are obtained. Nevertheless, i t  may be the only choice open 
1141. 
In most applications of systems analysis, the scarcity of data and the inaccura- 
cy of models do not permit or justify a preciw probabilistic analysis. We should, howev- 
er, always realize the probabilistic character of the probiem and proceed cautiously. A 
comrrion pitfall, for exm-iple, is to take the expected vdue of the environmerrtd irrput as 
a basis for determining the expected value of the outcome. A simple example will ex- 
plain what happens Assume a crop increases with humidity, but is more senstive to 
drought than tn a b o v f - a v e r a ~  rainfall. Then, calculating the averagr? crop nn the basis 
of average rainfall is wrong, because the losses due to dry years will be more than the 
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gains in the wet years. In more precise terms, what we should do  is to calculate the 
average value of y in equation (1). It cannot be replaced by putting the average value of 
r into the formula, unless the relation is linear. 
Let us focus again on the future aspect of analysis. In the context of using 
predictive models we should know e, the state of nature; ahead of time, and this require- 
ment raises two principal questions: 
(i) How far ahead should we know the state of nature? 
(ii) How far ahead a n  we know the state of nature, that is, how far can a 
reasonable forecast of the state of nature reach (based on past data and available 
knowledge)? 
T h e  answer to the second question is that, whatever the forecasting tech- 
niques, the ability to determine the future in terms of reasonable probabilistic confidence 
is limited. There are, however, many cases in analysis where the future that we must 
consider is more distant than our forecast of the external conditims can reach. In these 
cases, the analyst tends to represent the future environment by scenurios, i.e., hy- 
pothesized chains of events. H e  is still able to say: if the external events follow scenario 
No. I, the results of the action will be ,., but he cannot say much about the probabilities 
A few remarks are appropriak here: 
a) As the probabilities of the scenarios are not known, nothing can be said 
about the expected outcome of the action. 
b) It is important to consider several scenarios, and to choose then in a sys- 
tematic way. For example, it is appropriate to consider the scenario that seems to be 
most likely. However, we may idso want to consider other scenarios, structured so as to 
be more unfavorable to achieving the objective, but which we feel are still likely. 
c) An alternative that is very sensitive to a small change in the scenario 
should be rejected, nr redesigned with the purpose of decreasing the .sensitivity. 
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In some applications of systems analysis it is appropriate to replace a proba- 
bilistic forecast of the future or an impartial scenario by an active element, an element 
that will respond to our actiorr in such a way as to purposely upwt the potential benefits 
For example, when a plan for developing water resources is being considered, 
we may ask whether the water demands of all users will be satisfied under all posslble 
circumstances if this plan is implemented. This  question calls for an examination of the 
worst case of the weather and other conditions. W e  can, for that purpose, treat the state 
of nature as acting against us. In the model, we can assign the role of nature to an anta- 
gonistic player, and thus make another use of gaming. Needless to say, to get reasonable 
conclusions, the action possibilities available to the opponent will have to be bounded in 
some way, otherwise, no water system could withstand the test. In any case, the game 
will reveal what exogenous conditions are the most dangerous, and we can then try to as- 
sess whether these conditions are likely to happen. 
Analyzing infrequent contingencies 
In many analyses there is a need to consider infrepuent contingencies, events 
or conditions that may happen whose probabilities are low or very low, but which-if 
they happen-have significant conaquences. Usually, these cm.squences are nf a detri- 
mentd nature-if they were benefits we would not worry. 
T h e  analysis has two parts. The  first uses a m d e l  or an understanding of 
the system to determine "what will happen if...;" that is, it looks at various possible 
failures uf system cunrpot-bents (;i leak i r~  the cooling tubes of a I-ruclear rextur, fur exm-I- 
ple), or at various possible events in the environment (an earthquake, for example), and it 
predicts the consequences of the adverse event. Usually, these are serious consequences: 
a blow-up of the plant, a dpsiruction of the pipeline, etc, 
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T h e  second part deals with estimating the probability of a gven  failure or 
outside event and-when many possible failures or adverse events are consiclered- 
estimatirrg the correlations. This analysis means an inquiry h to  whether the various 
failures, if they happen, happen independently of each other. This part of the study, i.e., 
estlrnating the probabilities, is otlen referred to as risk assessment. 
Summary remarks 
Let us come back to the main questions addressed at the bepnning of this 
section: 
- What will the future of the world be if the action is taken? 
- How certain is the answer that analysis can supply? 
In m?ny worthwhile applications of systems analysis, in spite of all the efforts 
that can be put into model-building and forecasting activities, we usually cannot claim 
that the consequences we predict will happen with reasonably high probabilities. It 
should be understood from what has been said that this uncertainty in the answer cannot 
be entirely overcome. Is it, then, reasonable to spend money and time on systems 
analysis, to build and use models in cases where they cannot predict accurately? 
T h e  answer is yes. For one thing, the decisionmaker has tn make a decision 
anyway, and even imperfect assistance by analysis may be better than pure j u w e n t  
and intuition. Second, analysis may permit comparing alterna~ives, even if the absolute 
accuracy of predicting the consequences is low. 
For exm~ple,  assun-le there is no probabilistic forecast uf the future, but ally a 
few scenarios. If we then detect, by a consistent model-based analysis, that the conse- 
quences of action a1 are better than those of action a2 under all, or most, of the represen- 
tative .wnwios, this result is a useful indication. 
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Other usefbl indications that a model can provide are indications of sensitivi- 
ty: a course of action that makes a system insensitive to exogenous factors, or makes it 
able to r a w e r  (resilient), is a preferable one, even if we do not know its consequences 
exactly. 
4.5 FORECASTlNG PROBABLE S T A T E S  O F  THE W O R L D  
Forecasting in systems analysis 
Forecasting is needed in every systems-analysis study. B e f ~ r e  any action cart 
be evaluated, we require a forecast of the future 'state of the world." as a context in 
which the consequences of an action can be predicted and compared. Forecasting is 
needed even when we just want to discover if some action is needed. Weather forecast- 
ing is one example, econometric forecasts used to draw inferences about the future state 
of national economies are another. We should note that, although sophisticated models 
and extensive statistical data analysis are used in these two forecasts, we do not insist on 
knowing the cause-effect relationships. T h e  forecasting m d e l s  show correlations, but 
may fail to show dependencies. It is a common pitfall to neglect the difference, and thus 
to draw false conclusions about what a deliberate action may bring about. For example, 
we cannot cause rainfall by forcing the birds to fly at low altitudes, although the two 
facts are known to be strongly correlated in some climates (because both of them are ef- 
fects of the same cause-air humidity). 
A forecast of the future state of the world is, of course, also needed when one 
wants to know what the probable consequences of an intended action are. As pointed out 
in section 4.4, it is important, in this case, to distinguish between the phenomena or 
features of the world that will be influenced by the action (the object system), and the 
ones that will not (the environment, state of nature). 
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If our confidence in the accuracy of the forecast is not extremely h e ,  we 
may want to carry out the analysis for several different projections of possible states of 
the world. 
Forecasting techniques 
Forecasting can be done in a variety of ways. Forecasting techniques range 
from expert judgements to mathematical forecasting models. Whatever technique is be- 
ing used, a forecast is always based on past and current data, observations, or measure- 
ments. When based on expert judgment, it is done to a large extent implicitly, and in 
model-based forecasting, explicitly. 
It may be appropriate, at this point, to indicate that even the best forecasting 
technique determines the future only in a probabilistic way. For example, it may-in the 
best case-state the expected value and the variance, or the confidence interval within 
which the value will be contained with some probability. T h e  variance, or the confi- 
dence interval just mentioned, is bound to increase as the future considered is more dis- 
tant. In view of the available data, a forecasting technique should be chosen that is not 
too sophisticated for the circumstances. Tn many cases simple forecasting models are 
ofren as good as the very complex onw, if data are scarce. It  may alm be impractical, in 
the early stages of analysis when more qualitative answers are sought, to use the more 
complex forecasting models. Simp!ified versicns may be useful at these stages. 
Data and results 
In any forecasting technique, we make the essential assumption that the future 
is partially determined by the past, on which data can be made available. This  assump- 
tion implies these important questions related to the &tn needed for a r~l iable forecan. 
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(1) How far into the past should the record reach? 
(ii) How broad should the observations be, Le., how many different phenome- 
rra must be observed to furecast one selected phenomenon in the future? 
(iii) Can we trade the length of record for broadness of observations, and, if 
so, to what extent? 
(iv) How far ahead can we infer from the data available? 
W e  stress that one should not overestimate the power and possibilities of fore- 
casting techniques based on statistical data and formal models. For one thing, the data 
may not be rich enough to provide the necessary length and broadness of the record. 
Secondly, the phenomena in the past were observed (measured) with errors. Thirdly, 
there are phenomena to be forecast in some systems analyses that are related to 
phenomena in the past that are either not measurable, or missing from the statistics. For 
example, long-term forecasts of changes in technology due to inventions, and forecasts of 
changes in societal and political attitudes, have natures that deny success to formal 
model-based forecasting methods 
There certainly are many other cases where expert-based, judgmental fore- 
carting may be appropriate, because human experience and intuition may-implicitly and 
even uncmsciously-make use of correlations and asmiations that cannot readily be for- 
malized. There are various methods for organizing and assessing the results of expert 
evaluation; they are superior to the usual committee activity for using groups of experts 
for forecasting, parameter estimation, the ranking of alternatives, and certain other pur- 
pws 
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4.6 C O M P A R I N G  A N D  RANKING ALTERNATIVES 
Dimculties of comparison 
Assume the alternatives have been selected and screened, and the presumed 
consequences of each determined. How can we compare them? An obvious method is to 
display the alternatives in a suitable framework so that the differences and similarities 
stand out. The  analyst may also do more; for example, he may rank the alternatives ac- 
cording to one or more specified criteria, so that the decisionmaker's choice is made 
easier. 
There are several reasons why ranking alternatives is difficult, except in the 
simplest cases. 
- In mast practical cases alternative A may b~ si~perinr tn B in mmp asppcts 
and inferior in the others. 
- T h e  diverse consequences of an alternative cannot be aggregated into a sin- 
gle performance index, which bears a satisfactory relation to attaining the objectives. 
- When outcomes are s p r e d  over time, and not in the same way for various 
alternatives, their rankings may change with time. 
- There may exist consequences that are nonquantifiable on a generally ac- 
cepted basis and that may be quantified by judgment only. 
- T h e  future conditions under which a proposed alternative will have to 
function are unpredictable. A t  the same time, the range of probable future conditions is 
wide and bears strongly on the presumed consequences. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulties and all the incommensurability of 
various effects and consequences of the alternatives, a choice has to be made by the de- 
cisionmaker. 
We are concerned about the extent to which this decision can be assisted by 
the analyst, for example, the extent and the means by which we can reduce the variety 
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of features of each alternative into possibly few, but nevertheless reliable, indicators. 
A danger is oversimplification, i.e., of trying to merge too many things into a 
single index value. One  should not neglect the fact that a subjective judgement by the 
decisionrr~aker on a set of displayed impacts may be more adequate than an index ar- 
rived at by arbitrary quantification, questionable arguments, and value estimates by the 
analysts. Simple judgement may quite often lead to the right decision, as opposed to the 
theory-based decision done in the right way. There is, however, a lot of significant 
research devoted to the problem of analyzing and modeling cognitive value systems. 
Judgmental comparison and ranking 
T h e  simplest method, as mentioned above, is to display the impacts of the al- 
ternatives to the decisionmaker. Such a display is sometimes referred to as a scorecard 
(see the example in Chapter 8). A scorecard aims to present the decisionm aker with the 
full spectrum of consequences, both good and bad, with an indication of who gets the 
benefits and who pays the costs The  decisionmaker can superimpose on this relatively 
objective information his feelings for the values, as well as incorporate the value judg- 
ments of the society he represents. This  approach makes it also possible to show sensi- 
tivities, that is, to show how the impacts change when parameters and external conditions 
vary. One merely prepares a scorecard for the same alternatives under the changed 
conditions, and superimposes it on the previous one. 
T h e  scorecard is also effective for multiple deci,ionrnakers, far each indivi- 
dual may form his own opinion based on his preferences and prejudices and a consensus 
car] then be worked oul throug;h irimrnittee action. It is also easily uriderstwd by the 
public at large. 
Any evaluat~on and ranking of the alternatives by analysts or experts may 4- 
nore impr tant  factors known tn the decisionmaker but npver made explicit tn the 
analysts and experts Therefore, such ranking may be unsatisfactory to the decisionmak- 
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er. For this reason alone, he should always be presented with the major alternatives 
and their impacts. In other words, when we present a decisionmaker with the result of 
someone else's evaluation, we should produce the scorecard for all highly ranked alterna- 
tives 
T h e  sheer mass of information, however, makes the use of indices of various 
sorts attractive. 
Cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit criteria 
For the purpose of comparing and ranking alternatives, one often tries to 
describe their relative merits by means of one, or at most a few, indicators (index value, 
figure of merit, or objective function). Any such approach has to sacrifice the details, 
the individual features of the alternatives, for the sake of making comparison easier. 
Cost-effectiveness can be used to rank alternatives when there is a single 
dominant objective and the effectiveness of the various alternatives in attaining this ob- 
jective can be measured on a single scale that is directly related to the objective, or is a 
good proxy for it. Alternatives are ranked either in terms of decreasing effectiveness 
for equal cost or, less frequently, in terms of increasing cost for equal effectiveness. 
Sometimes the ratio of cost to effectiveness is used, but this practice is open to all the ob- 
jections that apply to the use of ratios as criteria, for example, because this kind of cri- 
teria mask the differences in scale 11 51. 
T h e  cost-effectiveness criterion is open to a number of objections. For one, 
even in the simplest cases, effectiveness may not measure value, which depends on the 
particular decisionmaker. Fur another, if the ranking is clusr, the decisionn-~Aer n-lay 
want to consider secondary effect2 
Another objection is that cost as used in  cost-effectiveness reflects only the 
costs that are inputs-the mnnpy, rclsol.lrces, time, and manpower rqui red  to implement 
and maintain an alternative. T h e  penalties or losses that may accompany an implernent- 
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ed alternative-it may, for instance, interfere with something else that is wanted or 
bring undesirable consequences to other people-are costs that are not taken into account. 
Finally, even if cost and effectiveness are properly determined, the decision- 
maker is sfiU faced with the problerr~ of what to chom.  H e  needs some way to set the 
scale of effort-either a cost he must not exceed or an effectiveness level he needs to 
achieve. The  ratio of cost to effectiveness may not be a satisfactory guide, even if he is 
totally uninterested in the scale of effort. 
Cost-benefit analysis can, in a theoretical sense, handle the difficulties associ- 
ated with cost-effectiveness. In this approach, the cons and benefits that follow each 
choice of an alternative, properly associated with the times at which they occur, are 
measured in the same units, usually monetary. Whether such a transfer into monetary 
terms can be viewed as valid is, however, a difficult question. 
Value and utility approaches. 
A decisionmaker for whom a systems analysis is made faces the following si- 
tuation: there are several alternatives from which to choose, each of them with many 
consequences (impacts), and, moreover, the impacts predicted for each alternative are 
different under different future conditions. One does not know which of the future con- 
ditions (referred to as states of nature, x t i o n  44) will occur. 
If a scorecard approach is used, there will be as many scorecards for each al- 
ternative as there are scenarios of the future to be considered. On each scorecard the 
number of entries is the number of impacts multiplied by the number of alternatives to 
be evaluated a - ~ d  co~ri~pued.  The  result may be that the amount of data is  fit^ too l u g e  
for the decisionmaker, without some aggregation, to make a judgmental ranking and 
choice. 
It is therpforp understandable that there is a tendency to evaluate each alter- 
native by a single indicator such as effectiveness for fixed cost or net bene,fit in a cost- 
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benefit analysis We still have, of course, the various possible futures, and hence 
several different values of the chosen indicator for each alternative. Nevertheless, the 
display of alternatives is more lucid and transparent. 
T h e  concept of using a single indicator for many noncorr~mensurable features 
of an object, in our case, an assumed alternative, is well known to decision analysts, who 
have formalized it as a mulriarrribure value function. In thls approach one tries to 
build a function by which a value v is assigned to the consequence of an alternative, 
whereby this consequence is assmed to have n different value-relevant attributes: 
where y L y 2  . - . , yn are the value-relevant attributes measured on their appropriate 
scales. 
T h e  function in (2) is a model of the decisionmaker's value system. It has to 
be established on the basis of his preferences, that is, of his individual judgments, and 
this is where the difficulties arise. In practice, it is, for many reasons, hard to obtain a 
value function that could replace the actual decision on a complex and unique issue. It is 
possible, however, for multiaftribute value functions to be used as a guide or directive in 
the initial selection, design, and fine tuning of alternatives, or as one of the ranking cri- 
teria to be compared with rankings done by other means. A public official's preferences 
are, in general, the preferences of the people he represents; it is through this association 
that the analyst can get an idea of the decisionmaker's preferences. One  still faces the 
problen-i of uncertainty: ever1 if we agree to evaluate the alternatives by a sirigle iridica- 
tor for each of the possible states of nature, how should they be ranked, since we do not 
know which of these states of nature will occur? 
Let us assume that, from one source or ancther, the prohahilities of the va.ri- 
ous future states of nature are known or can be estimated. It seems quite natural i n  this 
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case, or at least simplest, to rank the alternatives on the basis of the mathematical ex- 
pectation (expected value) of the outcome. 
Using the multiattribute value function expressed by equation (Z), which as- 
signs a single value indicator to a given alternative under one state of nature, one c m  
calculate the average value for each alternative over all possible states of nature. Then, 
the alternatives can be ranked according to the average, i.e., expected, values 
It should be noted, however, that a straightforward average may not indicate 
the choice that a given decisionmaker would make. 
T o  take account of this, we use the notion of utility, a basic concept used in 
the theory of decision under risk.  This theory assigns utilities to consequences in such a 
way that ranking expected utilities of alternatives is the same as the decisionmaker's 
preference order for the same alternatives 
Utilities are assigned to consequences by means of utilityfunctions; a utility 
function describes the attitude of the given decisionmaker towards risk, and is thus dif- 
ferent for risk-averse and risk-prone decisionmakers 
Direct use of utility theory, i.e., of utility functions and the expected utility 
principle, for ranking alternatives md ,  in particular, for a final choice, cannot be recom- 
mended without reservation. Assigning utility via utility functions involves a great deal 
of judgment by the analyst; several simplifying assumptions with r q x a  tn the form nf 
these functions are also indispensable. Nevertheless, as in the case of miltiattribute value 
functions, expected utility may be valuable as one of the means by which the alternatives 
can be screened and assigned a tentative ranking, even if it cannot be rec~mmended as a 
unique mind ultin-rate criterion for choice. 
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Summary remarks 
Relatively little can be added to what was said in the first paragraph of this 
section: comparing alternatives is, in all practical cases, difficult. We should also 
remember that, although comparison and choice go together, the two parts are done by 
different people. It  is the duty of the analyst to provide a comparison of alternahves and 
possibly a ranking, but it is the right and responsibility of the decisionmaker to make the 
choice. 
It is, therefore, reasonable not to rely entirely on the rankings provided by 
cost-benefit, multiattribute value functions, or utility functions A scorecard of the alter- 
natives, reduced, perhaps, to the most relevant attributes, should accompany any rank- 
ordered list of alternatives 
The  analyst should not be upset if the choice of the decisionmaker is the 
third-ranked or fourth-ranked alternative. Such a choice indicates only that there are 
additional aspects and values that the decisionmaker did not disclow before, or that were 
misunderstood by the analyst. T h e  analysis at this stage may be considered a success if 
the decisionmaker has made an analysis-based decision in the sense that he has chosen a 
course af action taking into account consequences that have been duly and appropriately 
analyzed. We must remember, however, that the analyst's goal is not merely to find the 
course of action best suited to achieve the decisionmaker's objectives and satisfy his con- 
straints, but to find the course of action closest to this ideal that can be accepted by the 
other participants in the decisionmaking process and then implemented without undesir- 
able modification, or extra cost and delay. 
A s  mentioned in section 4.1 the analyst's role does not necessarily end at rhe 
choice by the decisionmakers of a particular course of action. ,fiLnalysts will usually be 
called on to assist with implementation, especially in the early part of this process when 
there may be a need to interpret aspects of the program, as well as for modifications due 
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to circumstanas that were impossible to anticipate earlier. Analysts, although probably 
not the same analysts, will also play an important role when it comes to evaluating the 
results of the implemented action, and the original analysis itself. 
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